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Confidence and the constructive trust 
Tang Hang Wu‘ 
Assistant Professor, National University of Singapore, Advocate and Solicitor (Singapore), 
Solicitor (England and Wales) 
Almost every leading work on the law of confidence mentions the possibility of 
a declaration of a constructive trust as a remedy for  a claim involving an abuse 
of confidence. Apart from the Canadian Supreme Court, no other appellate 
court in the Commonwealth has seriously debated this issue. This paper 
investigates the legitimacy of the use of the constructive trust in this context. 
The origins of the law of confidence can be traced to a humble rhyme in equity: 
‘These three give place in a court of conscience, fraud, accident, and breach of 
confidence.’ ’ English judges have displayed admirable ingenuity that led them 
to develop a relatively sophisticated doctrine capable of protecting diverse 
subject matters from trade to personal secrets, despite its modest doctrinal 
beginning. The maturity of the law of confidence is a proud testament to equity’s 
creativity and ability to cope with modem developments in a changing social 
system. The change is a continuing one. As Keene LJ, in Douglas v Hello! Ltd,’ 
observed: 
‘breach of confidence is a developing area of the law, the boundaries of which 
are not immutable but may change to reflect changes in society, technology 
and business practice.” 
In the past decade, the law of confidence received a tremendous boost in terms 
of the relief available to the claimant. The Canadian Supreme Court‘ added the 
constructive trust to the armoury of remedies available against a defendant. It is 
* I am indebted to Professor George Wei, Associate Professor Ye0 Tiong Min, h4r K C Lye 
and Derek Davies for their invaluable comments on an earlier draft. I have also had the benefit 
of discussing some of the points with Professor Tan Sook Yee and Professor Tan Yock Lin. 
The usual caveats apply. 
1. See F W Maitland Equity A Course of LPctures (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2nd edn, 1936) p 7. Cited as ‘Three things are to be helpt in Conscience; Fraud, 
Accident and things of Confidence’ (1 Rolle’s Abridgement 374) by Megarry J in Coco v 
A N Clark [ 19681 FSR 415 at 420421. Cf R G Hammond ‘The Origins of the Equitable 
Doctrine of Breach of Confidence’ [ 19791 Anglo-Am LR 7 1, who traced the origins of the 
action to early decisions on copyright of unpublished works. 
2. [2001] 2WLR992: seeNMoreham(2001)64MLR767;MElliott(2001)60CLJ231; 
R Singh and J Strachan ‘The Right To Privacy In English Law’ (2002) 2 EHLR 129. 
3. [2001] 2 WLR 992 at 1035. 
4 Lac Minerals v International Corona Resources (1989) 61 DLR (4th) 14: see 
D W M Waters (1990) 69 Can BR, P D Maddaugh ‘Confidence Abused: Lac Minerals Ltd v 
International Corona Resources Lts (1990) 16 Can Business Law J 198; J D Davies ‘Duties of 
Confidence and Loyalty’ [ 19901 LMCLQ 4; P Birks ‘The Remedies For Abuse of Confidential 
Information’ [ 19901 LMCLQ 460; G Hammond ‘Equity And Abohve Commercial Transactions’ 
(1990) 106 LQR 207. 
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easy to see why such a proprietary right is desirable to a claimant.’ The most 
obvious advantage is that the claimant would have priority in the event of the 
defendant’s insolvency. 
The use of the constructive trust as described above is relatively novel. Such 
a possibility was not discussed in earlier seminal works on the law of confidenceP 
This development has been noticed by leading works’ in other Commonwealth 
jurisdictions, such as Australia and England. In the House of Lords, Lord Goff 
alluded in A-G v Guardian Newspapers (No 2)’ to the prospect of declaring a 
constructive trust.” It would seem that the House of Lords would have been 
prepared to declare a constructive trust on the facts if the claimants had pursued 
it. The application for a constructive trust met with less success in Satnam 
Investments Lrd v Dunlop Heywood & Co Ltd.“’The second defendant had received 
confidential information from the first defendant who was a fiduciary of the 
claimant. As a result, the second defendant acquired a piece of property that 
the claimant had intended to purchase. The prayer for a declaration that the second 
defendant held the property on constructive trust for the claimant succeeded before 
the trial judge. On appeal, this decision was overturned. Nourse W described the 
trial judge’s conclusion that the second defendant’s knowledge of the first 
defendant’s breach of fiduciary duty was a sufficient basis to declare the second 
defendant a constructive trustee as a surprising proposition. More recently, in 
United Pan-Europe Communications NVv Deutsche Bank AG” the English Court 
of Appeal also considered the issue of remedies. This case was an appeal on an 
application for an interim injunction. The appeal was allowed and the English 
Court of Appeal found that there was a seriously arguable case that a proprietary 
5. See R Goff and G Jones The L a w  of’Restitution, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 6th 
edn, 2002) pp 79-80. See also G Virgo The Principles ofthe Law ofRestitution (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999) pp 598-599. 
6. Eg see G Jones ‘Benefits Obtained in Breach of Confidence‘ (1970) 86 LQR 463; 
and F Gurry Breach of Confidence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984). 
7. See eg W R Cornish Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks arid Allied 
Rights (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 4th edn, 1999) pp 33 1-332; Goff and Jones, n 5 above, 
pp 756, 764-765; S Ricketson The LUM. ef Intellectuul Properly: Copyright, Designs & 
Confidential Inforination (Sydney: LBC Information Services, 2nd edn, 1999) paras 27- 
100: M kchardson and J Stuckey-Clarke ‘Breach of Confidence’ in P Parkmson (ed) The 
Principles ofEquiv (Sydney: LBC Lnformation Services, 1996) pp 4 6 H 7 0 ;  Clerk & Lindsell 
on Torts (London: Sweet &Maxwell, 2000) p 1539; L Bently and B Sherman Intellectual 
Properp Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2001 ) pp 974976. 
8. [ 19901 1 AC 109 at 288. See also Lord Keith at 263. where he said: ‘There remains 
of course, the question of whether the Crown might successfully maintain a claim that it is 
in equity the owner of the copyright in the book. Such a claim has not yet been advanced. 
but might well succeed if i t  were to be.’ 
9. In other areas of intellectual property. the courts have ordered the defendant to transfer 
the intellectual property right to the claimant. See Missing Link Sqftware v Magee [ 19891 
1 FSR 361 (copyright in a computer program). See also, generally, British Syphon Co Lid 
v George Sidney Homewood 11 9561 73 RPC 225; and Putchett v Sterling Engineering Cri 
Ltd [ 19551 72 RPC 50 (where the defendant was made to assign the patent to the claimants). 
10. [ 19991 3 All ER 652: see C A Freedman ‘Confidential Commercial Information and 
Breach of Fiduciary Duty -The Liability of Third Parties in Knowing Receipt To Make 
Restitution’ [2000] Intellectual Property Q 208. 
11. [2000] 2 BCLC 461. 
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right was available for the alleged misuse of confidential information. On balance, 
in England, based on the current weight of authorities, the position seems to be 
that it is plausible to make the argument that a constructive trust is a potential 
relief for a breach of confidence. In Australia, the position is similar. While Laddie J 
in Ocular Sciences Lfd v Aspect Vision Care‘? refused to grant a prayer for a 
constructive trust for an alleged brcach of confidence, he did not completely reject 
the notion that a constructive trust may be granted in certain circumstances. 
What is notcworthy is that in all these cases, the court’s remarks were at most 
obiter dicta: in Guardian Newspapers, the constructive trust was not seriously 
pursued; in Uiiifed Pan-Europe the matter was merely an interlocutory 
application; and in Ocular Sciences, the prayer for the relief was ultimately 
rejected. This issue has not had the benefit of serious debate in the highest 
appellate courts elsewhere in the Commonwealth, save in the Canadian Supreme 
Court. The object ofthis paper is to investigate whether the use of the constructive 
trust as a relief for a breach of confidence is defensible. 
TERMINOLOGY 
It  is important to note that this paper is confined to the issue as to whether a 
proprietary right may be awarded for an abuse of confidence; it does not deal wilh 
whcn an account of profits is appropriate as a rclicf for an abuse of confidence, 
although this relief has sometimes been dcscribed as a constructive trust. It is, 
therefore, important to clear the ground before we begin analysing the problcm at 
hand. Virtually every writer in this area prefaces the discussion with a lament of 
the confusion with the use of terminology in this area. ’ This paper is no different. 
The courts have uscd the term ‘constructive trust’ indiscriminately. The tcrm 
‘constructive trust’ may import two meanings. First, the defendant may hold the 
property in circumstances where the law will regard the defendant as holding i t  
on trust for the claimant. In this instance, the constructive trust is employcd in a 
proprietary sense. Secondly, the term ‘constructive trust‘ may also be used to mean 
a relief granted to the claimant against a defendant which is personal in nature, 
for example, whcrc the defendant is ‘liable to account as a constructive trustcc‘ 
to the claimant. Examples of categories where this formula is used arc against 
defendants who: (a) intermeddle and voluntarily assume the mantle of trusteeship 
(frzisfee de soti fort); (b) dishonestly assist in a breach of trust or fiduciary duty; 
and (c) knowingly receive property that is impressed with a trust or fiduciary 
duty. The superimposition of the term ‘constructive trust’ in these situations is 
simply a shorthand to denote a personal liability to account in equity.’.‘ Dr Lionel 
Smith perceptively points out that the use of this formula perpetuates the 
pretence that beneficiaries can only sue their trustees.li This is not true. Thus, 
the use of the term ‘constructive trust’ in this context is unhelpful and 
12. [ 19971 RPC 289: see B Gray ‘Ocular Sciences: A New Vision for the Doctrine of 
Breach of  Confidence?’ (1999) 23 MULR 241. 
13. See eg P J Millett ‘Equity - The Road Ahcad’ (1995) 9 Trust Law 11-11 35: L D Smith 
‘Constructive Trusts And Constructive Trustees’ (1999) 58 CLJ 294; P J Millett ‘Restitution 
And Constructive Trusts’ (1998) I 14 LQR 399. 
14. See Poragon Finance plc v DB Thakerar & Co [ 19991 I All ER 400 at 408-4 10. 
15. L D Smith ‘Constructive Trusts And Constructive Trustees’ (1999) 59 CLJ 194 at 30 I .  
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misleading.” It would be better to abandon reference to the constructive trust 
when referring to an equitable duty to account. In this paper, where the term 
‘constructive trust’ is employed, it is used in a proprietary sense. 
Therefore, this paper deals solely with the question whether it is appropriate 
to give the claimant a proprietary right in cases involving a breach of confidence. 
CONFIDENCE AND THE CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST 
I. The Lac Minerals decision - facts and holdings 
The facts of Lac Minerals v Interriational Corona Resources” are well known. 
Lac Minerals Ltd (‘Lac’) was a senior mining company, whereas International 
Corona Resources (‘Corona’) was a junior mining company. Corona provided 
confidential information to Lac pertaining to the core drilling results conducted 
on the property owned by Mrs Williams (the ‘Williams’ property’) on an informal 
oral understanding as to how each would conduct itself in anticipation of a joint 
venture between both companies. In breach of confidence, Lac placed an 
independent offer for the Williams’ property and succeeded in obtaining the 
property. The Williams’ property turned out to be extremely valuable and was 
valued up to Can $1.95 billion. Corona sued for a breach of confidence and 
fiduciary duty. 
The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Lac Minerals was divided on 
many counts. They agreed that on the facts the circumstances between the 
parties gave rise to an obligation of confidence on Lac’s part. However. this 
was where the agreement between the judges ended. The majorityIX thought 
that while there was an obligation of confidence, there was no fiduciary 
obligation owed by Lac to Corona. With regard to the relief available, the 
majority, La Forest, Lamer and Wilson JJ, decided that Lac held the Williams 
property on constructive trust for Corona. Sopinka and McIntyre JJ disagreed. 
Thus, the ratio of this case appears to be that a constructive trust is available 
as a relief for an action for breach of confidence even if no fiduciary duty was 
present. 
In summary, the following reasons can be distilled from the decision of the 
majority in Lac Minerals why a proprietary right was granted: (a) this was a 
case of wrongful interception. I‘) Lac had intercepted the Williams’ property that 
would have otherwise been acquired by Corona. But for Lac’s breach of 
confidence, Corona would have obtained the Williams’ property;?” (b) the 
constructive trust was declared to protect the ‘institution of bargaining in good 
faith’. It is a deterrent against the breach of such a duty;” (c) the Williams’ 
16. See eg Satriain Investments Ltd 1’ Durilop Heywood & Co Ltd [ 19991 3 All ER 652, 
where the Court of Appeal appeared to have conflated the equitable duty to account and the 
constructive trust. 
17. (1989) 61 DLR (4th) 14. 
18. Sopinka. Lamer and Mclntyre JJ. Cf La Forest and Wilson JJ held that there was a 
fiduciary obligation not to misuse the information. 
19. (1989) 61 DLR (4th) 14 at 45. per La Forest J. See also L Bently and B Sherman 
Intellectual Propery Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001 ) p 975. 
20. (1989) 61 DLR (4th) 14. 
21. (1989) 61 DLR (4th) 14 at 47. per La Forest J. 
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property was a specific and unique property.?? It was virtually impossible to 
value the Williams property accurately; (d) an action for a breach of confidence 
was very similar to a breach of fiduciary duty. If a constructive trust could be 
declared for the latter; then it would be anomalous that a constructive trust could 
not be declared for a breach of confidence;’? and (e) it would be unconscionable 
for Lac to retain the property.?‘ 
Prima facie, the arguments marshalled by the majority of the Supreme Court 
of Canada are formidable. Each reason given will be analysed in detail below. 
In addition, three further grounds to justify the declaration of a constructive 
trust will also be explored. First, whether a constructive trust may be justified 
as there was a pre-existing ‘proprietary base’. Secondly, the defendant had 
engaged in an activity, which he was under an cquitable duty to pursue for 
the claimant, resulting in a wrongful gain to the defendant. This has been 
termed as a ‘deemed agency gain’.? Hence, it is argued that it may be 
appropriate to make the defendant to hold such gains on constructive trust 
for the claimant. Finally, the paper considers whether it can be argued that a 
constructive trust should be declared by extending the authority of A-G ,for 
Horig Kong v Reid.” 
11. Wrongful interception of property2’ 
La Forest J articulated the argument as follows: 
‘[A] constructive trust should only be awardcd if there is a reason to grant to 
the plaintiff the additional rights that flow from recognition of a right of 
property. Among the most important of these will be that it is appropriate 
that the plaintiff receive the priority accorded to the holder of a right of 
property in bankruptcy. More important in this case is the right of the property 
holder to have changes in value accrue to his account rather than to the 
account of the wrongdoer. Here as well it is justified to grant a right of property 
since the concurrent findings below are that the defendant intercepted the 
plaintiff and thereby frustrated its efforts to obtain a specific and unique 
property that the courts below held would otherwise have been acquired. 
The recognition of a constructive trust simply redirects the title of the 
Williams property to its original course.’’x 
22. (1989) 61 DLR (4th) 14 at 48-52, per La Forest J. 
23. (1989) 61 DLR (4th) 14 at 17, per Lamer J. 
24. (1989) 61 DLR (4th) 14 at 51-52, per La Forest J. 
25. See R Goode ‘Property and Unjust Enrichment’ in A Burrows (ed) Essays 017 the 
Law ofRestiruriorz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 199 1) p 215; R Goode ‘Proprietary 
Restitutionary Claims’ in W R Cornish (ed) Restituriorz Past Presetif und Future (Oxford: 
Hart Publishing, 1998) p 63. 
26. [ 19941 1 AC 324. 
27. Wrongful interception of a specific and unique property must be distinguished from 
the ‘interceptive subtraction’ debate in the law ofun.just enrichment. The latter deals with 
the problem of creating a necessary link to show that the defendant’s enrichment was at the 
expense of the claimant. In a breach of confidence, it is the wrong that creates the link 
between the claimant and the defendant. The privity issue is therefore not crucial. See 
A Burrows The Law @‘Restitution (London: Buttenvorths, 2nd edn, 2002) pp 31-32. 
28. (1989) 61 DLR (4th) 14 at 51. 
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Two distinct arguments can be drawn from the passage above on why the relief 
was granted. First, this was a case of a wrongful interception of a specific property 
by the defendant. The interception was wrongful because the defendant had 
breached the claimant's confidence. But for the defendant's wrongful 
interception the plaintiff would have acquired the property. Secondly, the 
property intercepted was a specific and unique property. 
With this reasoning, one can immediately see that the basis for the declaration 
of a constructive trust is not peculiar to a claim for abuse of confidence. It is 
arguable that, on this reasoning, the court may declare a constructive trust in 
appropriate circumstances where there has been a wrongful interception of a 
unique property. This argument is supported by the recent development of the 
so-called Pallarit v Morgan equity" by the English Court of Appeal in Banner 
Homes Group v LiiffDevelopments. "' The facts of Banner Homes are quite similar 
to that of Lac Minerals." The dispute arose from a Sailed joint venture between 
two companies. Luff Developments and Banner Homes reached an agreement 
in principle to acquire a particular site through a new company, which they 
agreed they would own in equal shares. Subsequently, Luff Developments had 
second thoughts about the joint venture, but did not inform Banner Homes of 
its doubts. It did not do so because i t  was afraid that Banncr Homes would also 
bid for the site if the joint venture fell through. After Luff Developments acquired 
the site through its wholly owned subsidiary, it informed Banner Homes that it 
was withdrawing from the proposed joint venture. Banner Homes sued Luff 
Developments. Banner Homes' principal claims were twofold: ( a ;  an oral 
agrccment had been made for the acquisition and dcvelopment of the site; and. 
altcrnativcly. (b )  notwithstanding the absence of any concluded agreement. the 
circumstances gave rise to a constructive trust. The trial judge dismissed 
the action as he Sound there was no concluded agreemcnt. The trial judge also 
declined to declare a constructivc trust. Banner Homes appealed against the 
judge's dismissal ofthe constructive trust. The Court of Appeal invoked the so- 
called Pullatit v Morgciri equity and dcclarcd that Luff Devclopments held the 
shares in the subsidiary equally for itself and Banner Homes." 
Another argumcnt that can be discerned o n  why a constructive trust was 
declared in Lac Mitiercils is that the property intercepted was a unique and 
specific property. This proceeds upon an analogy with a purchaser who had 
29. See Prillurzr ~'Mor~guri [ 19531 Ch 43. 119521 2 All ER 951. [ 19521 2 TLR 813. 
30. [2000] Ch 372: 5ee M P Thompson 'Constructive Trusts and Non-Binding 
Agreements' I2001 I Conv 265. 
31. LIL. Mirierals I' / r i femdor iul  Coroiici Resources ( 1989) 61 DLR (4th) 14. 
32. See N Hophns 'The Pallant v Morgan "Equity"' 120021 Conv 35 for the conceptual 
difficulties with this decision. The judge borrowed principles horn the laws of constructive 
trust. estoppel and restitution. Perhaps. a better explanation ofthe case is one based on  a 
contractual analysis. The observations of S Hedley 'Work Done In Anticipation Of 
A Contract Which Does Not Materialise: A Response' in Cornish. n 25 above. pp 195. 
197, albeit in another context. is equally apt here. He argues: 'But why should contract be 
excluded'? Why should parties' hope that they would make a big contract prevent a finding 
that they have injact made a more modest one'! Why should the courts ignore good evidence 
o fa  contract'? The C O U ~  can simply enforce the agreement thc parties actually made. vague 
though it might be. and leave aside the parties' fantasies as to agreements which they might 
have reached in other circumstances.' 
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contracted to buy land. It is textbook law that the vendor who has entered into 
a contract for sale of land holds the land as a constructive trustee for the purchaser 
due to the perceived inadequacy of damages as a substitute for the performance 
of the contract. In other words, a monetary award would not adequately 
recompense the purchaser, as he or she would not be able to use the award to 
purchase a duplicate property. As equity has an anticipatory effect, equity deems 
the purchaser as the beneficial owner of the land. 
However, the analogy is not a perfect one. The paramount factor in explaining 
why a vendor who is in breach of contract for sale of land is a constructive trustee 
is the availability of specific performance to the purchaser.’’ However, specific 
performance is not relevant in the context of a breach of confidence. The primary 
remedy for a breach of confidence is to injunct the defendant from using the 
confidential information. The anticipatory effect of equity cannot be used to 
justify why the claimant is granted a constructive trust. The fact that the claimant 
could not be adequately recompensed by a money award because the Williams’ 
property was specific, unique and impossible to value would, therefore, be a 
question of the shortcoming of the law of damages rather than of the law on the 
constructive trust. If the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada was of the 
opinion that the only way the claimant could be properly compensated was by 
an order to transfer the Williams’ property, then this should be seen as a unique 
form of remedial response where damages are inadequate. As Janet O’Sullivan 
said in the context of restitutionary damages7‘ for a breach of contract: 
‘if there is something deficient about the operation of the compensatory 
principle, and this is the only impetus for a restitutionary measure, then this 
deficiency should be rectified dire~tly.’~’ 
The same argument applies here. If the only impetus for the constructive trust 
to be declared is the remedial inadequacy of the current law of damages, then 
this should be addressed directly. The wrongful interception and the uniqueness 
of the property do not justify the declaration of a constructive trust. It does not 
tell us why this claimant should receive priority in bankruptcy.3h The wrongful 
interception and the fact that the property was unique and specific may make 
out a case, at most, why an order for spec@ restiturioti should be made.” General 
33. See S Worthington ‘Proprietary Remedies: The Nexus Between Specific Performance 
And Constructive Trust‘ (1996-97) 11  JCL 1 .  
34. See A - G  v Blake [2001] 1 AC 268. 
35. J O’Sullivan ‘Reflections On The Role of Restitutionary Damages To Protect 
Contractual Expectations’ in D Johnston and R Zimmerman (eds) Unjustified Eiirichnient 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) pp 327,334. Much has been written on 
the House of Lords’ decision in A - G  v Blake: see eg A Phang and P W Lee ‘Rationalising 
Restitutionary Damages In Contract Law - A n  Elusive Or Illusory Quest‘ [20011 17 JCL 240; 
M McInnes ‘Gain Based Relief For Breach Of Contract: Atrortiey Geizerul v Blake‘ [2001] 
35 Can Business Law J 72;  J Edelman ‘Restitutionary Damages And Disgorgenient 
Damages For Breach Of Contract’ [2001] RLR 129. See also D Campbell and D Harris 
‘In Defence Of Breach: A Critique Of Restitution And The Performance Interest’ (2002) 
22 LS 208, who argue that the award of restitutionary damages for a breach of a commercial 
contract is incompatible with the operation of a market economy. 
36. Lac Minerals v Iiite~iiutionul Cororiu Resources (1989) 61 DLR (4th) 14 at 5 I .  
37. Scc n 9 above for cases where specific restitution were ordered in the contcxt of other 
intellectual property rights. 
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principles would have to be worked out on when such an order would be 
appropriate." To declare a constructive trust that necessarily confers such 
priority would be to over-compensate the claimant. It is misleading to clothe 
such an order in the language of constructive trust. It is unacceptable both as a 
matter of history and principle. The inappropriate use of the constructive trust 
would lead to the undesirable effect of distorting the law in this area. 
111. Institution of good faith in bargaining-" 
It is doubtful that an English court would view this argument kindly. It is beyond 
the scope of this paper to investigate the issue of whether the law should 
recognise good faith i n  pre-contractual negotiations. Suffice to say, English 
law does not recognise the 'institution of good faith"" in bargaining (save for 
insurance contracts) as demonstrated by the decision in Walford v Miles." The 
House of Lords held that an agreement to negotiate had no legal content. Lord 
Ackncr forcefully said that: 'A duty to negotiate in  good faith is as unworkable 
in practice as i t  is inherently inconsistent with the position of a negotiating 
party. It is here the uncertainty lies.": Thus, this justification for imposing a 
constructive trust would probably not find favour in an English court. 
IV. Confidence = fiduciary? 
Another justification for a declaration of a constructive trust is based on the 
perceived symmetry between the law of confidence and fiduciary law. Since a 
38. Cf P Birks 'Rights, Wrongs And Remedies' (2000) OJLS 1 : P Birks 'Three Kinds Of 
Objection To Discretionary Remedialism' (2000) 29 W Australian LR I ,  who argues that the 
development of discretionary remedialism is undesirable. However. the present author is more 
persuaded by S Evans 'Defending Discretionary Remedialism' (2001 ) 23 Syd LR 463: and 
D Wright 'Wrong and Remedy: A Sticky Relationship' [2001] Sing JLS 300. 
39. See R E Hawkins 'Lac And The Emerging Obligation To Bargain In Good Faith' 
( 1990) 15 Queen's LJ 65. 
40. The literature on good faith is voluminous. See generally M Clarke 'The Common Law 
of Contract in 1993: Is There A Gcncral Doctrine of Good Faith'!' ( 1993) 23 HKLJ 3 18; 
E McKendrick 'Work Done In Anticipation OfA Contract Which Does Not Materialise' in 
Cornish, n 25 above. pp 163,1869 I ; J W Carter and M P Futmston 'Good Faith and Fairness 
in Negotiations of Contracts' ( 1994) 8 JCL I : N Cohen 'Good Faith and Fault in Contract 
Law' in J Beatson and D Friedmann (eds) Good Foith AridFuult ir7 Coritrncf Lotc (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1995) p 25: J M Paterson 'The Contract to Negotiate in Good 
Faith: Recognition and Enforcement' (1996) 10 JCL 120. See also A F Mason 'Contract. 
Gotd Faith And Equitable Standards In Fair Dealing' (2OOo) 1 I6 LQR 66: P Y Woo 'Protecting 
Parties Reasonable Expectations: A General Principle of Good Faith' [2001] 
OU Commonwealth LJ 195. 
41. [ 19931 2 AC 128. See also B J Davenport 'Lock-Out Agreements' ( 199 1 ) 107 LQR 366; 
I Brown 'The Contract To Negotiate: A Thing Writ in Water' [ I9921 JBL 353; P Neil1 'A Key 
to Lock-Out Agreements'? ( 1992) 108 LQR 405; J Cumberbatch 'In Freedom's Cause: The 
Contract to Negotiate' ( 1992) I2 OJLS 586: E Peel '"Locking-Out" and "Locking-In": 
The Enforceability of Agreements to Negotiate' (1992) 5 1 CLJ 21 1 : B Jamieson 'Lock-Out 
Agreement is Unenforceahle' [ 19921 LMCLQ 16. 
42. [ 19921 2 AC 1% at I 38. Cf E McKendrick 'Good Faith: A Matter of Principle?' in A 
D M Forte (ed) C'oodFuirli iri COiztl.u(.fAizdPiq,er~(Oxford: Hart Publishing. 1999)p 39. 
Confidence and the constructive trust 143 
constructive trust may be declared for a breach of fiduciary duty, it is argued 
that it would be anomalous if the constructive trust was unavailable as a relief 
for a breach of confidence -bearing in mind that both actions are very similar." 
The assertion that both actions are closely related is historically accurate.u Both 
are actions founded in equity. However, it is the present writer's view that what 
began as an accident in history should not continue to dictate the development 
of the law of confidence."' There are enough differences between an action for 
breach of confidence and breach of fiduciary duty to justify a distinction between 
both actions. 
The policy reason behind fiduciary law is quite different from that of the law 
of confidence.'h Fiduciary law is designed to ensure that fiduciaries honour their 
undertaking and act accordingly. Equity takes a very cynical view of fiduciaries. 
Harsh profit-stripping rules were evolved to ensure that this underlying policy 
behind fiduciary law was achieved." In short, these rules were meant to act as a 
strong deterrent and have a prophylactic effect to discourage the fiduciary from 
breaching his duty. 
The law of confidence proceeds on an entirely different footing. It has often 
been said that the basis of the law of confidence rests on the equitable principle 
of good faith.'x However, this assertion does not take us very far. What exactly 
are the boundaries of the equitable principle of good faith? It is unclear whether 
good faith is a standard to be adhered to or a legal obligation. Gurry advances 
an alternative approach. He says we should treat the law of confidence as a sui 
generis action."" He argues that the authorities have frequently drawn from 
principles of contract, equity and property that it is more realistic to treat the 
action as one of a composite jurisidictional basis. The two dominant 
characteristics that illustrate this characterisation have been pragmatism and 
flexibility. While this is a plausible approach, the present writer is of the view 
that it does not aid in the future development of the law. Further, if the action in 
43. In Coco vA N Clark [ 19681 FSR 4 I5 at 420421,  Megarry J described confidence as 
the cousin of trust. 
44. See L S Sealy 'Fiduciary Relationships' ( 1962) CLJ 69: R G Harnmond 'The Origins 
of the Equitable Duty of Confidence' [ 19791 Anglo-Am LR 7; see J Phillips 'Prince Albcrt 
and the Etchings' (1984) 12 EIPR 344. 
45. See R P Meagher. W M C Gurnrnow and J R FLehane Equity Docrrines andHemedies 
(Sydney: Butterworths, 3rd edn, 1992) pp 869-870, where the learned editors explained 
that the reference of the classic authorities to 'trust and confidence' was made when both 
terms were used interchangeably. They are of the opinion that the better view is that the 
equitable duty of confidence be regarded as a specific field of its own. 
46. See J Glover 'Is Breach of Confidence A Fiduciary Wrong'? Preserving the Reach of 
Judge-Made Law' (2001) 21 LS 594; P Birks An Introduction to the Law of Restitution 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) pp 332-333; P Birks 'The Content of Fiduciary 
Obligation' (2002) 16 Trust Law Int 34. 
47. Keech v Sanford ( 1726) Sel Cas Ch 61. 
48. See Salrman v Campbell (1948) 65 RPC 203; see also G Jones 'Restitution of Benefits 
Obtained in Breach of Another's Confidence' (1970) 86 LQR 463 at 466; and Cornish. 
n 7 above, pp 305-307. 
49. F Gurry Breach qf Confidence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984) pp 5 8 4 0 ;  
F Guny 'Breach of Confidence' in P D Finn (ed) Essays in Equify (Sydney: The Law Book 
Company Ltd, 1985) p 1 10. This analysis seems to have the support of Binnie J ofthe Supreme 
Court of Canada in Cadhuiy Schweppes Inc v FBI Foods (1999) 167 DLR (4th) 57. 
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confidence is sui generis, then it should innovate i t  own unique remedial 
response and not borrow from the constructive trust, which is steeped in history. 
A more serious indictment of Curry’s proposal is that i t  confuses the 
jurisdictional origins with the substantive classification of the cause of action. 
While it may true that the courts have drawn from other areas of the law in the 
past, this does not answer the question, ie substantively where should we place 
the law of confidence in the taxonomy of the law? 
It is time to realise that it is no longer possible to analogise the law of 
confidence with one single area of law. There are two kinds of breaches of 
confidence - personal and trade secrets. It can be argued that personal secrets 
are protected under a developing right of privacy.’” This is due to the 
‘horizontal’ effect of the Human Rights Act 1998.’’ Thus, the protection of 
personal secrets stems from the individual’s entitlement to respect to his or her 
private and family life. Sedley LJ in Douglas v Hello! Lrd’? insightfully noted: 
’The law no longer needs to construct an artificial relationship of 
confidentiality between intruder and victim: it can recognise privacy itself 
as a legal principle drawn from the fundamental value of personal 
autonomy.’” 
With regard to trade and commercial secrets, the argument premised on privacy 
is less cogent.” There are two competing analyses - confidential information 
as property of the claimant and breach of confidence as a civil wrong. The present 
writer is of the view that it is more helpful to characterise the law of confidence 
as a species of civil wrongs” not unlike wrongs committed in the law of 
negligence.’“ The resistance to look towards the law of torts in analysing the 
law of confidence stems from two principal reasons. The first reason is that 
historically we do not associate torts with equitable wrongs. However, Birks 
has pointed out: 
‘it is difficult to find or to create any theoretical interest in or justification 
for the continued separation between legal and equitable wrongs. If one 
50. See M Richardson ‘Whither Breach of Confidence: A Right of Privacy For Australia‘?’ 
(2002) 26 MULR 381. 
51. This development is heartening as it was only ten years ago that it was emphatically said 
that English law does not recognise the tort of privacy: see K q e  v Roberrson [ 19911 FSR62. 
52. [2001] 2 WLR 992. 
53. [2001] 2 WLR992 at 1025. 
54. Cf E I Du Pont de Nernoun & Co bzc 1’ Christopher (1970) 43 I F 2d 1012 at 1015, 
which referred to ‘commercial privacy’. 
55. See J Edelman ‘Equitable Torts’ (2002) 10 Torts LJ 64. 
56. See A M Tettenhorn ‘Damages For Breach of Confidence: An English Perspective’ 
(1987) Intellectual Property J 181 at 197. See also G Wei ‘Surreptitious Takings of 
Confidential Information’ ( 1992) 12 LS 302 at 304. who described the test for determining 
liability set out by Megarry J in Cocn 1’ AN Clark as being ‘Atkinian’ in nature. A rival 
characterisation is to see a breach of confidence as a form of interference with contractual 
relations. However. as seen by the case of Douglas \‘Hello! Ltd [200 1 I 2 WLR 992, it may 
be quite difticult to establish that the defendants had instigated or been involved in a breach 
of contractual relations. 
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observes the restriction of tort to common law, one confines one’s discussion 
to a sub-set of wrongs identified by history rather than by any rational 
principle.’” 
The second explanation why the law of confidence is not often associated with 
tort law is the erroneous assumption that if we do so, we would have to proceed 
by way of analogy with the tort of conversion - which, in turn, leads to the 
inevitable conclusion that confidential information is property.sR This need not 
necessarily be so. Quite apart from conversion, it is possible to argue that the 
duty of confidence is quite similar to a duty of care in negligence. The 
philosophy underpinning the law in this area is the promotion of ‘the policy of 
holding confidences sacr~sanct’.’~ On reflection, the inquiry on whether a duty 
of confidence is imposed on a defendant mirrors the three-stage inquiry in 
determining a duty of care in negligence.60 First, there is the element of 
foreseeability, ie whether the circumstances are such that any reasonable man 
would have realised that the information was received in confidence. Secondly, 
the concept of proximity is also present. The confidential information must have 
been received in circumstances where the recipient had knowledge or is held to 
have agreed that the information is confidential. Finally, the courts must also 
consider whether it is just and reasonable to impose such a duty of confidence 
on the defendant. The final inquiry finds its expression most acutely in third 
party recipients of confidential information and intentional takings of 
confidential information.“ 
57. P Birks ‘The Concept of a Civil Wrong’ in D G Owen (ed) Philosophical Foundations of 
Tort Law, (Oxford: Oxfors University Press, 1995) pp 31, 35. See also Law Com no 110 
Breach of Confidence (Cmnd 8388, 1981); Clerk & Lindsell on Torts, n 7 above, pp 15 17- 
1540; J Edelman ‘Equitable Torts’ (2002) 10 Torts LJ 64. 
58. Eg see P M North ‘Breach of Confidence: Is There A New Tort?’ (1972) 12 LS 149; 
and Birks, n 46 above, pp 343-347, who argue that the analogy with conversion is a useful 
one to make. Cf Gurry, n 49 above, p 56, who concludes that the role of tort is a peripheral. 
See also Cornish, n 7 above, p 306, who, perhaps unfairly, dismisses arguments premised 
on tortious principles as being attributed to rash disputation by ‘scientifically-minded jurists’. 
59. Gurry, n 49 above, p 59. 
60. See Lord Goff in A-G v Guardian Newspapers (No 2 )  [ 19901 1 AC 109 at 281, where 
he said: ‘I start with the broad general principle (which I do not intend in any way to be 
definitive) that a duty of confidence arises when confidential information comes to the 
knowledge of a person (the confidant) in circumstances where he has notice, or is held to 
have agreed, that the information is confidential, with the effect that it would be just in all 
circumstances that he should be precluded from disclosing the information to others.’ See 
also M Richardson ‘Breach of Confidence, Surreptitiously or Accidentally Obtained 
Information and Privacy: Theory Versus Law’ (1994) 19 MULR 673 at 699. 
61. See Cornish, n 7 above, pp 306-307, who perceptively lists down the points that 
matter in the jurisdiction debate. They are: (a) innocent recipients; (b) circumstances where 
damages may be awarded for breach; (c) possibility of damages for injury to feelings; 
(d)  liability of indirect recipients; and (e) the effect of dealings that treat the information 
as property. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper, i t  is the present writer’s view 
that there are distinct advantages in analysing the law of confidence with reference to the 
law of negligence, as issues (a)4d) could be dealt with more effectively. See eg Cadbury 
Schweppes Inc v FBI Foods (1999) 167 DLR (4th) 577 at 600, where Binnie J suggested 
that tort principles could have an impact on the assessment of damages for a breach of 
confidence. 
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In addition, the standard mandated for a duty of confidence is quite different 
from a fiduciary duty. The touchstone of liability is pegged to that of the 
reasonable man, as explained by Megarry J in Coco v A N Clark." Some eminent 
Australian equity lawyersh' have astutely observed, 'the reasonable man labours 
at law not in equity which sets higher standards for fiduciaries, despite the 
contrary view of Megarry J in Coco v A . N .  Clark'. This shows that the 
fundamental standard of the law of confidence and fiduciary law is very 
dissimilar. Liability for the former is premised on the reasonable man, whereas 
the latter is based on the notion of utter selflessness. The latter is a much higher 
standard than what can be expected from the ordinary man on the Clapham bus 
or the Bondi tram. Therefore, i t  is a fallacy to argue that since the law of 
confidence and the fiduciary duty are very similar actions, the harsh profit 
stripping rules in fiduciary law would apply as a matter of course in the law of 
Confidence. 
Further, although profit-stripping rules are theoretically available for a breach 
of confidenceH in the form of an account of profits, they are seldom ordered.6r 
Besides the serious practical difficulty in assessing an order for an account of 
profits, there is considerable doubt when an account of profits should be ordered. 
G u y  valiantly tries to distil principles of when an account of profits should be 
ordered. He lists down situations of when an account of profits should not 
be ordered.hh However, he points out the cases do not give us any guidance of 
when an account of profits is to be ordered. Professor Jones has argued that the 
defendant should be made to account for profitsh7 or hold property on 
constructive trusthX where the breach of confidence is a conscious breach. This 
suggestion is unpersuasive. It is more convincing to deal with conscious breaches 
as instances where the inquiry is centred on whether exemplary damages should 
be ordered. The decision of Aquciculture Corpn v New Zealand Green Mussel 
Co Lrd (No 2f'" suggests that an exemplary award could be made"' for a breach 
of confidence. 
Thus, it would seem that a personal profit stripping remedy is rarely employed 
in a breach of confidence in absence of a breach of fiduciary duty. It is also 
uncertain in what situations they should be ordered. Therefore, since a personal 
profit stripping remedy is rarely granted for a breach of confidence, it is the 
62. [ 19681 FSR 4 15 at 4 2 0 4 2  1. 
63. Meagher. Gummow and Lehane, n 45 above. p 5 I .  
64. See Peter Pan Mani4acturing Corpn v Corsets Silhouette Ltd [ 19641 1 WLR 96; Ansell 
Rubber Co Pty Ltd v Allied Rubber Industries Pty Ltd [ 19721 RPC 8 1 1 : AB Consolidated 
Ltd v Europe Strength Food Co [ 19781 2 NZLR 515. 
65. See eg Seager v Copydex Ltd [ 19671 RPC 349: and Aquaculture Corpri v New Zealand 
Green Mussel Co Ltd (No 2 )  [ 19901 NZLR 1-99. See also Curry, n 49 above, pp 417-427. Cf 
the courts are more willing to grant an account of profits when the breach of confidence involves 
a breach of fiduciw as well. See Coleman Tciymur Ltd v Oukes [200 I ] 2 BCLC 749; Nomalec 
Ltd v Britton [ 19831 FSR 3 18. 
66. Curry, n 49 above. pp 4 17427.  
67. G Jones 'Benefits Obtained in Breach of Confidence' ( 1970) 86 LQR 463 at 486488. 
68. Goff and Jones, n 5 above, pp 764-765. 
69. [ 19901 NZLR 299. See also Aquaculture Corpn v New Zealand Green Mussel Co 
Lid (No 3 )  ( 1986) 1 NZIPR 678 at 69 1. 
70. Cf Meagher. Gummow and Lehane. n 45 above. p 4127. 
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present writer’s view that the courts should exercise even more restraint when 
granting a proprietary right.7’ 
V. Proprietary base 
The argument in favour for the declaration of a constructive trust would go 
something like this.” Confidential information is property belonging to 
the claimant. Hence, there is what is known as a ‘proprietary base’.7‘ When the 
defendant uses the confidential information without the claimant‘s authority 
or knowledge, this is equivalent to the defendant misusing the property of the 
claimant. The benefits obtained or gains made using this ‘proprietary base’ 
belong to the claimant. The unjust factor would be the ignorance of the claimant 
of the unauthorised use of the confidential inf~rmation.~‘ Thus, it would be 
appropriate to grant the claimant a proprietary right. This argument need not 
detain us too long. There is a fatal flaw - the basic premise that confidential 
information can be equated with property is u n s ~ s t a i n a b l e . ~ ~  The prevalent 
judicial view is that information is not property.’(’ Since information is not 
regarded as property, the proprietary base argument fails. 
71. See the recent case of Cudbury Schweppes /tic v FBI Foods (1999) 167 DLR (4th) 
577, where the Supreme Court of Canada refused to declare a constructive trust. 
72. There is a growing disenchantment with the ‘proprietary base’ analysis. It does not 
explain adequately why a claimant is entitled to enlarge his proprietary base. See C Rotherham 
‘Restitution and Property Rites: Reason and Ritual in the Law of Proprietary Remedies’ 
(2000) 1 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 205 at 228, who argues: ‘The attraction of the notion 
of a subsisting proprietary base seems to lie in its capacity to suggest that the courts are not 
involved with the redistribution of property rights. However, the proprietary base is too 
anaemic and unfamiliar a concept to convince us in this regard.’ His ideas are developed 
fully in C Rotherham Proprietary Remedies In Context: A Study In The Judicial 
Redistrihution Of P roperty Rights (Oxford: Hart Publishing. 2002). 
73. See Birks, n 46 above, pp 378-379. 
74. Birks, n 46 above, p 346. 
75. In any case, the debate on the definition of proprietary quality often suffers from the 
vice of circularity. See K Gray and S F Gray Elements of Land Law (London: Butterworths, 
2001) pp 107-1 10. Gray and Gray point out the absurdity of the inquiry: ‘On conventional 
reasoning, a claim comprises “property” if enforceahle against a stranger; and claims are 
enforceable against strangers provided that they are proprietary in character. Such 
propositions are entirely tautological in so far as proprietary character is supposedly made 
to depend on some criterion of “permanence” or “stability”. It is radical and obscurantist 
nonsense to formulate a test of proprietary character in this way’ (emphasis in original). 
76. S e e  Boardmcm Phipps [ 19671 2 AC 46 at 128, where Lord Upjohn said that confidential 
information was not ‘property in any normal sense, but equity will restrain its transmission to 
another if in breach of some confidential relationship’. See also Sattium Invesrnierits Lrd v Dunlop 
Heywood & Co Ltd [ 19991 3 All ER 652. The High Court of Australia has also rejected the 
proprietary analysis - see Moorgate Tobacco Co Ltd v Philip Morris Ltd ( 1984) 156 CLR 41 4 
at 438. More recently, the property argument was also rejected in Cadbury Schuvppes Inc 1’ FBI 
Foods ( 1999) 167 DLR (4th) 577. For an examination of why a ‘propeIty approach’ to information 
should be rejected, see Institute of Law Research and Reform Edmonton, Alberta Trade Secrets 
ReporrNo46(July 1986)pp 137-140. SeealsoCornish,n7above,pp330-332;PKohlerand 
N Palmer ‘Information as Property’ in N Palmer and E McKendrick (eds) Interests in Goods 
(Lodon: LLP, 1998) p 1 .  Cf Lindu Chih Ling Koo v Lam Tai Hing (1992) IPR 607. 
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VI. Deemed agency gains 
This part of the paper examines whether the declaration of a constructive trust 
may be justified on Goode’s ‘deemed agency gains’ thesis. These are cases where 
the defendant’s gain derives not from the claimant’s asset but from activity 
undertaken by the defendant ‘for his own benefit which he was under an equitable 
duty, if he undertook it at all, to pursue for . . . [the clai~nant]’ .~~ Goode asserts: 
‘The typical case is that of the company director who uses his position to pursue 
for himself in dealings with T business opportunities, which should have been 
pursued on behalf of his company . . . In this case there has been no diminution 
in P’s [the claimant’s] estate. All that has happened is that D [the director] has 
broken a fiduciary obligation to subordinate his own interests to those of P 
and perhaps also the separate obligation not to make a secret pr~fit .’~’ 
Goode argues that since the gains should have been pursued for the claimant, 
there is a case for allowing the claimant to obtain the gain in specie, so long as 
this is not done to the detriment of the general creditors and secured creditors. 
Goode’s ‘deemed agency gains’ theory is controversial. It has been attacked on 
many fronts.’” This thesis has been examined and criticised thoroughly by Wright‘” 
and the arguments need not be repeated here. However, even if one accepts Goode’s 
‘deemed agency’ thesis, it does not have any application to a breach of confidence. 
Where there is an abuse of confidence, the use of the information was unaurhorised. 
It would be the height of artificiality to say that the defendant was under an agency 
duty to pursue the gains made for the claimant - the claimant’s complaint is 
essentially that the defendant had used the confidential information without his 
permission. Thus, the basic premise to argue for a ‘deemed agency gain’ is missing 
where there is a breach of confidence. 
VII. Analogy with A-G for Hong Kong v Re#‘ 
A further justification for a constructive trust is by extending the Privy Council’s 
decision in A-G for Hong Kong v Reid.’? In this case, Reid was the Director of 
Public Prosecutions for Hong Kong. Reid had accepted bribes. He used these 
bribes to purchase property in New Zealand. The Crown argued that due to 
Reid’s breach of fiduciary duty, it had a proprietary interest in the New Zealand 
property. The Privy Council accepted this argument. 
How did Reid’s obligation to make restitution for his wrongdoing translate 
into a proprietary right for thc Crown?x’ Several reasons can be discerned from 
77. R Goode ‘Proprietary Restitutionary Claims’ in Cornish, n 25 above. p 63. 
78. Goode. n 77 above, p 74. 
79 D Wright ‘The Remedial Constructive Trust and Insolvency’ in F Rose (ed) Restitution 
and Insolvency (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2000) pp 21 2-216: P J Millet ‘Bribes 
and Secret Commissions’ [ 19931 RLR 7 at 15-16 criticised this thesis as impractical and 
impossible to apply in practice; S Worthington ‘Three Questions on Proprietary 
Restitutionary Claims‘ in Cornish. n 25 above, p 7. 
80. See D Wright ‘The Remedial Constructive Trust and Insolvency’ in Rose, n 79 above, 
p 206. 
81. [1994] 1 AC 334. 
82. [I9941 1 AC 324. 
83. See P J Millet ‘Bribes and Secret Commissions’ [ 19931 RLR 7 for defence ofthe conclusion 
reached in Reid. See also P J Millett ‘Equity -The Road Ahead’ (1995) 9 Trust Law Int 35. 
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the judgment. First, the moment Mr Reid accepted the bribe, he was under an 
obligation to turn over the bribe to the Crown. Since equity regards as done 
what ought to be done, the bribe belonged to the Crown the moment it was 
received. The second possible rationalisation of the case is that if a proprietary 
right was not granted in this case, it would result in a windfall to the other 
creditors. A proprietary right is apt because the Crown did not take the risk of 
Mr Reid’s insolvency. A third justification is one based on public policy. It 
was said in Reid that bribery is an ‘evil practice which threatens the foundations 
of any civilised society’.’‘ Thus, the constructive trust was declared as 
deterrence against such behaviour. The fourth reason in favour of a proprietary 
right in this context is the risk of dissipation of assets by the wrongdoer. If a 
constructive trust was not declared there was the danger the wrongdoer would 
whisk the asset to some ‘Shangri La’ that hides bribes and other corrupt 
moneys. Lord Millett writing extra-judicially offers yet a further 
rationalisation of Reid 
‘The decision of the Privy Council in Art-Gen for Hong Kong v Reid does 
nor decide that a breach of fiduciary duty inevitably gives rise to a 
constructive trust ... it [the reason] is fairly obvious ... Mr. Reid had no 
authority to receive payments for his employer’s account at all; and it follows 
that he had no authority to mix them with his own money and use them for 
his own purposes, subject only to a duty to account.’x5 
If the reasoning in Reid is to be extended to a breach of confidence, then it 
may be possible to justify a proprietary right for a claim for abuse of 
confidence. However, for such an extension to be defensible two propositions 
must be established. First, it must be possible to analogise a fiduciary 
obligation with an obligation of confidence. Secondly, the reasons given in 
the Reid decision on why a proprietary right was granted must be defended. It 
is suggested that both propositions cannot be made out. On the first level, 
it is wrong to conflate a fiduciary duty with a duty of confidence. As shown 
above, both actions, although originating in equity, proceed on very different 
policy considerations. Further, the Reid decision can be attacked. Detractors 
of this decision are many.*‘ The reasons articulated in Reid to justify a 
proprietary right, ie deterrence, non-acceptance of the risk of insolvency of 
the fiduciary by the claimant, prevention of an unjust windfall to the claimant’s 
creditors and fear of dissipation of assets by the defendant are unc~nvincing.’~ 
It is not the intention of the present writer to rehearse all the arguments why 
the Reid decision is wrong. Suffice to say powerful arguments such as the fact 
84. [I9941 1 AC 324 at 330. 
85. P J Millett ‘Restitution And Constructive Trusts’ [ 19981 I14 LQR 399 at 407. 
86. Eg D Crilley ‘A Case Of Proprietary Overkill’ [ 19941 RLR 57; R A Pearce ‘Personal 
and Proprietary Claims Against Bribees’ [1994] LMCLQ 189; W J Swadling ‘Property 
And Unjust Enrichment’ in J W Harris (ed) Property Prob lem From Genes To Pension 
Funds (London: Kluwer, 1997) pp 130, 141-143. 
87. It is doubtedthat a proprietary remedy would deter an insolvent defendant. Non-acceptance 
of risk of insolvency per se cannot be an explanation for a proprietary remedy. Eg a tort victim 
who did not accept risk of insolvency is not granted priority. Next, the ‘windfall’ argument 
is also suspect because this is not a situation of unjust enrichment but restitution for wrongs. 
Finally, the risk of dissipation argument is better dealt with an application for a freezing order. 
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that the Reid decision would result in: (a) unfairness to the interest of 
unsecured creditors in the event of insolvency; (b) the inconsistent treatment 
of claimants of civil wrongs; and (c) the lack of certainty of when a proprietary 
right would be ordered suggest that the critics of this decision are correct. If 
the foundation of a declaration of a constructive trust for a breach of 
confidence is based on the authority of the Reid decision, then it is this writer’s 
view that the foundation is decidedly shaky. 
VIII. Reversal of unconscionable conduct 
It is often said that a constructive trust arises due to the unconscionable 
conduct of the defendant. In the well-known decision of Beatty v Guggenheim 
Exploration Co,** Cardozo J used this formula to describe the constructive 
trust: 
‘[a] constructive trust is the formula through which the conscience of equity 
finds expression. When property has been acquired in such circumstances 
that the holder of the legal title may not in good conscience retain the 
beneficial interest, equity converts him into a trustee . . . A court of equity in 
decreeing a constructive trust is bound by no unyielding formula. The equity 
of the transaction must shape the measure of relief‘ (emphasis added).8y 
It can be argued that this approach has the support of Lord Browne- 
Wilkinson in Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London 
Borough Council,“’ where he said that a fundamental principle is that ‘equity 
operates on the conscience of the owner of the legal interest’. With regard 
to a breach of confidence, the learned editors of The Law of Restitutionyi 
argue that: 
‘The confidant may be declared to be a constructive trustee of specific assets, 
or a lien may be imposed over those assets, if confidential information is 
characterised as property or possibly, if his conduct is said to be 
unconscionable. It should be a significant consideration that the confidant 
had consciously broken confidence.’ 
The reference to the constructive trust arising due to the defendant’s 
unconscionable conduct is troubling. An objection to this formula is that the 
term ‘unconscionable conduct’ is unspecific. It is tantamount to granting an 
unguided discretion to judges in dealing with proprietary rights. It is hard to 
see how the terms ‘conscience’ and ‘unconscionable conduct’ assist judges 
in deciding whether to grant a claimant a proprietary right. La Forest J, in Lac 
Minerals, disavowed such an approach. He said: 
88. 122 NE 378 (NY, 1919). 
89. 122 NE 378 at 380,381 (NY, 1919). See also Baurngnrtner li Bnutngartner (1987) 
164 CLR 137 at 147, where Mason CJ and Wilson and Deane JJ said that: ‘the foundation 
for the imposition of a constructive trust . . . is that [the defendant’s] refusal to recognise the 
existence of [the claimant’s] equitable interest amounts to unconscionable conduct and . . . 
the trust is imposed as a remedy to circumvent that unconscionable conduct.’ 
90. [ 19961 AC 669 at 705. See also Paragon Finance plc 13 D B Thakernr & Co [ 19991 
1 All ER 400. 
91. Goff and Jones, n 5 above, pp 764765. 
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‘I do not countenance the view that a proprietary remedy can be imposed 
whenever it is ‘‘just” to do so, unless further guidance can be given as to 
what those situations may be. To allow such a result would be to leave the 
determination of proprietary rights to “some mix of judicial discretion” . . . 
and “the formless void of individual moral opinion”,’” 
The label ‘unconscionable conduct’ does not clarify matters at a1Ly3 Professor 
Arthur Leff has commented that: 
‘[unconscionability] tends to permit to make the true bases of decisions more 
hidden to those trying to use them as the basis of future planning. But more 
important, it tends to permit a court to be non-disclosive about the basis of 
its decision even to itself . . . Subsuming problems is not as good as solving 
them, and may retard solutions instead.’y4 
While it is true that equity began as a court of conscience, she has since 
developed in a principled manner to avoid the charge of arbitrariness and 
roguishness. It is apposite to pay heed to Selden’s articulation made in the 
seventeenth century of the usual complaint of equity: that justice was being 
dispensed according to the each Chancellor’s differing notion of conscience.”5 
More rccently, Professor Birks echoed Selden’s caution and delivered stinging 
criticisms to the proposition that equity is premised on the defendant’s 
unconscionable conduct.”h He rightly points out that such an endeavour 
displays an alarming ‘anti-analytical mentality’. He argues that the term 
‘unconscionable’ is so unspecific that ‘it simply conceals a private and 
intuitive evaluation’ .y7 
It may very well be that the criticisms above may be totally misplaced. If 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson had a technical meaning in mind of the word 
‘conscience’, then his formulation of the principles on trust law may be 
salvaged.y8 Equity has evolved such that the meaning of conscience is a technical 
one, where it can be said that the conscience of the defendant is affected even 
though there may be no moral turpitude. However, if the term conscience is 
understood to have a technical meaning and totally divorced from wrongdoing, 
92. Lac Minerals v International Corona Resources (1989) 61 DLR (4th) 14 at 51. 
93. See Royal Brunei Airlines v Tan [ 19951 2 AC 378 at 392. 
94. A Leff ‘Unconscionability And The Code - The Emperor’s New Clause’ (1967) 
115 UPaLR 485 at 557-559. 
95. F Pollock (ed) The Table Talk ofJohn Selden (London: Quaritch, 1927) p 43. 
96. P Birks ‘Equity in the Modern Law: An Exercise in Taxonomy’ (1996) 26 W 
Australian LR 1 at 16-17; P Birks ‘Annual Miegunyah Lecture: Equity, Conscience and 
Unjust Enrichment’ ( 1  999) 23 MULR 1 at 17-23. See also D R Klinck ‘The Unexamined 
“Conscience” of Contemporary Canadian Equity’ (200 1) 46 McGill LJ 57 1 at 6 1 M 1 1, 
where Klinck concludes tentatively ‘that the persistence of conscience . . . is simply a matter 
of inertia. The word is part of the traditional discourse of equity, and it is simply being 
reiterated in an “automatic” way’. See A F Mason ‘Contract, Good Faith And Equitable 
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dishonesty or moral turpitude on the defendant's part, then this formula does 
not add very much to our understanding of the constructive trust. As a matter of 
general principle, rather than guiding us, it has the potential to mislead us.'" 
CONCLUSION 
The law of constructive trust has been hamstrung by the lack of clarity both in 
terms of terminology and analysis. It is hoped that this paper has cleared some 
of the clutter in this area with regard to a declaration of a constructive trust for 
a breach of confidence. On balance, it is suggested that the justification given 
for the declaration of a constructive trust in Lac Minerals'" is unconvincing. 
While an order for specific restitution for a wrongful interception of a unique 
property may be defensible, there appears to be no reason why priority in 
insolvency should be granted to a claimant for an abuse of confidence. The 
conclusion reached by the present writer is that there are no compelling grounds 
why claimants for an abuse of confidence should be granted a proprietary right. 
99. See Virgo, n 5 above, pp 630-634 on the formidable problems of using conscience as 
the touchstone of the constructive trust. Two aspects need to be worked out - the degree of 
fault required and the point in time that the defendant's conscience is said to be affected. 
100. Lac Minerals v Infernational Corona Resources (1989) 6 1 DLR (4th) 14. 
